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Using RBAC Authorization

Role-based access control (RBAC) is a method of regulating access to computer or network resources based on the roles of individual users within an enterprise.

• API Overview
• Default Roles and Role Bindings
• Privilege Escalation Prevention and Bootstrapping
• Command-line Utilities
• Service Account Permissions
• Upgrading from 1.5
• Permissive RBAC Permissions

RBAC uses the rbac.authorization.k8s.io API GroupA set of related paths in the Kubernetes API. to drive authorization decisions, allowing admins to dynamically configure policies through the Kubernetes API.

As of 1.8, RBAC mode is stable and backed by the rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 API.

To enable RBAC, start the apiserver with --authorization-mode=RBAC.

API Overview

The RBAC API declares four top-level types which will be covered in this section. Users can interact with these resources as they would with any other API resource (via kubectl, API calls, etc.). For instance, kubectl apply -f (resource).yml can be used with any of these examples, though readers who wish to follow along should review the section on bootstrapping first.

Role and ClusterRole

In the RBAC API, a role contains rules that represent a set of permissions. Permissions are purely additive (there are no “deny” rules). A role can be defined within a namespace with a Role, or cluster-wide with a ClusterRole.

A Role can only be used to grant access to resources within a single namespace. Here’s an example Role in the “default” namespace that can be used to grant read access to pods:

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  namespace: default
  name: pod-reader
rules:
- apiGroups: [""] # "" indicates the core API group
  resources: ["pods"]
  verbs: ["get", "watch", "list"]

A ClusterRole can be used to grant the same permissions as a Role, but because they are cluster-scoped, they can also be used to grant access to:

• cluster-scoped resources (like nodes)
• non-resource endpoints (like “/healthz”)
• namespaced resources (like pods) across all namespaces (needed to run kubectl get pods --all-namespaces, for example)

The following ClusterRole can be used to grant read access to secrets in any particular namespace, or across all namespaces (depending on how it is bound):

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  # "namespace" omitted since ClusterRoles are not namespaced
  name: secret-reader
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["secrets"]
  verbs: ["get", "watch", "list"]

RoleBinding and ClusterRoleBinding

A role binding grants the permissions defined in a role to a user or set of users. It holds a list of subjects (users, groups, or service accounts), and a reference to the role being granted. Permissions can be granted within a namespace with a RoleBinding, or cluster-wide with a ClusterRoleBinding.

A RoleBinding may reference a Role in the same namespace. The following RoleBinding grants the “pod-reader” role to the user “jane” within the “default” namespace. This allows “jane” to read pods in the “default” namespace.

roleRef is how you will actually create the binding. The kind will be either Role or ClusterRole, and the name will reference the name of the specific Role or ClusterRole you want. In the example below, this RoleBinding is using roleRef to bind the user “jane” to the Role created above named pod-reader.

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
# This role binding allows "jane" to read pods in the "default" namespace.
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
  name: read-pods
  namespace: default
subjects:
- kind: User
  name: jane # Name is case sensitive
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
  kind: Role #this must be Role or ClusterRole
  name: pod-reader # this must match the name of the Role or ClusterRole you wish to bind to
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

A RoleBinding may also reference a ClusterRole to grant the permissions to namespaced resources defined in the ClusterRole within the RoleBinding’s namespace. This allows administrators to define a set of common roles for the entire cluster, then reuse them within multiple namespaces.

For instance, even though the following RoleBinding refers to a ClusterRole, “dave” (the subject, case sensitive) will only be able to read secrets in the “development” namespace (the namespace of the RoleBinding).

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
# This role binding allows "dave" to read secrets in the "development" namespace.
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
  name: read-secrets
  namespace: development # This only grants permissions within the "development" namespace.
subjects:
- kind: User
  name: dave # Name is case sensitive
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: secret-reader
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

Finally, a ClusterRoleBinding may be used to grant permission at the cluster level and in all namespaces. The following ClusterRoleBinding allows any user in the group “manager” to read secrets in any namespace.

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
# This cluster role binding allows anyone in the "manager" group to read secrets in any namespace.
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
  name: read-secrets-global
subjects:
- kind: Group
  name: manager # Name is case sensitive
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: secret-reader
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

You cannot modify which Role or ClusterRole a binding object refers to. Attempts to change the roleRef field of a binding object will result in a validation error. To change the roleRef field on an existing binding object, the binding object must be deleted and recreated. There are two primary reasons for this restriction:

1. A binding to a different role is a fundamentally different binding. Requiring a binding to be deleted/recreated in order to change the roleRef ensures the full list of subjects in the binding is intended to be granted the new role (as opposed to enabling accidentally modifying just the roleRef without verifying all of the existing subjects should be given the new role’s permissions).
2. Making roleRef immutable allows giving update permission on an existing binding object to a user, which lets them manage the list of subjects, without being able to change the role that is granted to those subjects.

The kubectl auth reconcile command-line utility creates or updates a manifest file containing RBAC objects, and handles deleting and recreating binding objects if required to change the role they refer to. See command usage and examples for more information.

Referring to Resources

Most resources are represented by a string representation of their name, such as “pods”, just as it appears in the URL for the relevant API endpoint. However, some Kubernetes APIs involve a “subresource”, such as the logs for a pod. The URL for the pods logs endpoint is:

GET /api/v1/namespaces/{namespace}/pods/{name}/log

In this case, “pods” is the namespaced resource, and “log” is a subresource of pods. To represent this in an RBAC role, use a slash to delimit the resource and subresource. To allow a subject to read both pods and pod logs, you would write:

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  namespace: default
  name: pod-and-pod-logs-reader
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["pods", "pods/log"]
  verbs: ["get", "list"]

Resources can also be referred to by name for certain requests through the resourceNames list. When specified, requests can be restricted to individual instances of a resource. To restrict a subject to only “get” and “update” a single configmap, you would write:

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  namespace: default
  name: configmap-updater
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["configmaps"]
  resourceNames: ["my-configmap"]
  verbs: ["update", "get"]

Note that create requests cannot be restricted by resourceName, as the object name is not known at authorization time. The other exception is deletecollection.

Aggregated ClusterRoles

As of 1.9, ClusterRoles can be created by combining other ClusterRoles using an aggregationRule. The permissions of aggregated ClusterRoles are controller-managed, and filled in by unioning the rules of any ClusterRole that matches the provided label selector. An example aggregated ClusterRole:

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: monitoring
aggregationRule:
  clusterRoleSelectors:
  - matchLabels:
      rbac.example.com/aggregate-to-monitoring: "true"
rules: [] # Rules are automatically filled in by the controller manager.

Creating a ClusterRole that matches the label selector will add rules to the aggregated ClusterRole. In this case rules can be added to the “monitoring” ClusterRole by creating another ClusterRole that has the label rbac.example.com/aggregate-to-monitoring: true.

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: monitoring-endpoints
  labels:
    rbac.example.com/aggregate-to-monitoring: "true"
# These rules will be added to the "monitoring" role.
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["services", "endpoints", "pods"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]

The default user-facing roles (described below) use ClusterRole aggregation. This lets admins include rules for custom resources, such as those served by CustomResourceDefinitions or Aggregated API servers, on the default roles.

For example, the following ClusterRoles let the “admin” and “edit” default roles manage the custom resource “CronTabs” and the “view” role perform read-only actions on the resource.

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: aggregate-cron-tabs-edit
  labels:
    # Add these permissions to the "admin" and "edit" default roles.
    rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-admin: "true"
    rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-edit: "true"
rules:
- apiGroups: ["stable.example.com"]
  resources: ["crontabs"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
---
kind: ClusterRole
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: aggregate-cron-tabs-view
  labels:
    # Add these permissions to the "view" default role.
    rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-view: "true"
rules:
- apiGroups: ["stable.example.com"]
  resources: ["crontabs"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]

Role Examples

Only the rules section is shown in the following examples.

Allow reading the resource “pods” in the core API GroupA set of related paths in the Kubernetes API. :

rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["pods"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]

Allow reading/writing “deployments” in both the “extensions” and “apps” API groups:

rules:
- apiGroups: ["extensions", "apps"]
  resources: ["deployments"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]

Allow reading “pods” and reading/writing “jobs”:

rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["pods"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
- apiGroups: ["batch", "extensions"]
  resources: ["jobs"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]

Allow reading a ConfigMap named “my-config” (must be bound with a RoleBinding to limit to a single ConfigMap in a single namespace):

rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["configmaps"]
  resourceNames: ["my-config"]
  verbs: ["get"]

Allow reading the resource “nodes” in the core group (because a Node is cluster-scoped, this must be in a ClusterRole bound with a ClusterRoleBinding to be effective):

rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["nodes"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]

Allow “GET” and “POST” requests to the non-resource endpoint “/healthz” and all subpaths (must be in a ClusterRole bound with a ClusterRoleBinding to be effective):

rules:
- nonResourceURLs: ["/healthz", "/healthz/*"] # '*' in a nonResourceURL is a suffix glob match
  verbs: ["get", "post"]

Referring to Subjects

A RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding binds a role to subjects. Subjects can be groups, users or service accounts.

Users are represented by strings. These can be plain usernames, like “alice”, email-style names, like “bob@example.com”, or numeric IDs represented as a string. It is up to the Kubernetes admin to configure the authentication modules to produce usernames in the desired format. The RBAC authorization system does not require any particular format. However, the prefix system: is reserved for Kubernetes system use, and so the admin should ensure usernames do not contain this prefix by accident.

Group information in Kubernetes is currently provided by the Authenticator modules. Groups, like users, are represented as strings, and that string has no format requirements, other than that the prefix system: is reserved.

Service Accounts have usernames with the system:serviceaccount: prefix and belong to groups with the system:serviceaccounts: prefix.

Role Binding Examples

Only the subjects section of a RoleBinding is shown in the following examples.

For a user named “alice@example.com”:

subjects:
- kind: User
  name: "alice@example.com"
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

For a group named “frontend-admins”:

subjects:
- kind: Group
  name: "frontend-admins"
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

For the default service account in the kube-system namespace:

subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
  name: default
  namespace: kube-system

For all service accounts in the “qa” namespace:

subjects:
- kind: Group
  name: system:serviceaccounts:qa
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

For all service accounts everywhere:

subjects:
- kind: Group
  name: system:serviceaccounts
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

For all authenticated users (version 1.5+):

subjects:
- kind: Group
  name: system:authenticated
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

For all unauthenticated users (version 1.5+):

subjects:
- kind: Group
  name: system:unauthenticated
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

For all users (version 1.5+):

subjects:
- kind: Group
  name: system:authenticated
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
- kind: Group
  name: system:unauthenticated
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

Default Roles and Role Bindings

API servers create a set of default ClusterRole and ClusterRoleBinding objects. Many of these are system: prefixed, which indicates that the resource is “owned” by the infrastructure. Modifications to these resources can result in non-functional clusters. One example is the system:node ClusterRole. This role defines permissions for kubelets. If the role is modified, it can prevent kubelets from working.

All of the default cluster roles and rolebindings are labeled with kubernetes.io/bootstrapping=rbac-defaults.

Auto-reconciliation

At each start-up, the API server updates default cluster roles with any missing permissions, and updates default cluster role bindings with any missing subjects. This allows the cluster to repair accidental modifications, and to keep roles and rolebindings up-to-date as permissions and subjects change in new releases.

To opt out of this reconciliation, set the rbac.authorization.kubernetes.io/autoupdate annotation on a default cluster role or rolebinding to false. Be aware that missing default permissions and subjects can result in non-functional clusters.

Auto-reconciliation is enabled in Kubernetes version 1.6+ when the RBAC authorizer is active.

Discovery Roles

Default role bindings authorize unauthenticated and authenticated users to read API information that is deemed safe to be publicly accessible (including CustomResourceDefinitions). To disable anonymous unauthenticated access add --anonymous-auth=false to the API server configuration.

To view the configuration of these roles via kubectl run:

kubectl get clusterroles system:discovery -o yaml

NOTE: editing the role is not recommended as changes will be overwritten on API server restart via auto-reconciliation (see above).

User-facing Roles

Some of the default roles are not system: prefixed. These are intended to be user-facing roles. They include super-user roles (cluster-admin), roles intended to be granted cluster-wide using ClusterRoleBindings (cluster-status), and roles intended to be granted within particular namespaces using RoleBindings (admin, edit, view).

As of 1.9, user-facing roles use ClusterRole Aggregation to allow admins to include rules for custom resources on these roles. To add rules to the “admin”, “edit”, or “view” role, create a ClusterRole with one or more of the following labels:

metadata:
  labels:
    rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-admin: "true"
    rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-edit: "true"
    rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-view: "true"

Core Component Roles

Other Component Roles

Controller Roles

The Kubernetes controller manager runs core control loops. When invoked with --use-service-account-credentials, each control loop is started using a separate service account. Corresponding roles exist for each control loop, prefixed with system:controller:. If the controller manager is not started with --use-service-account-credentials, it runs all control loops using its own credential, which must be granted all the relevant roles. These roles include:

• system:controller:attachdetach-controller
• system:controller:certificate-controller
• system:controller:clusterrole-aggregation-controller
• system:controller:cronjob-controller
• system:controller:daemon-set-controller
• system:controller:deployment-controller
• system:controller:disruption-controller
• system:controller:endpoint-controller
• system:controller:expand-controller
• system:controller:generic-garbage-collector
• system:controller:horizontal-pod-autoscaler
• system:controller:job-controller
• system:controller:namespace-controller
• system:controller:node-controller
• system:controller:persistent-volume-binder
• system:controller:pod-garbage-collector
• system:controller:pv-protection-controller
• system:controller:pvc-protection-controller
• system:controller:replicaset-controller
• system:controller:replication-controller
• system:controller:resourcequota-controller
• system:controller:root-ca-cert-publisher
• system:controller:route-controller
• system:controller:service-account-controller
• system:controller:service-controller
• system:controller:statefulset-controller
• system:controller:ttl-controller

Privilege Escalation Prevention and Bootstrapping

The RBAC API prevents users from escalating privileges by editing roles or role bindings. Because this is enforced at the API level, it applies even when the RBAC authorizer is not in use.

A user can only create/update a role if at least one of the following things is true:

1. They already have all the permissions contained in the role, at the same scope as the object being modified (cluster-wide for a ClusterRole, within the same namespace or cluster-wide for a Role)
2. They are given explicit permission to perform the escalate verb on the roles or clusterroles resource in the rbac.authorization.k8s.io API group (Kubernetes 1.12 and newer)

For example, if “user-1” does not have the ability to list secrets cluster-wide, they cannot create a ClusterRole containing that permission. To allow a user to create/update roles:

1. Grant them a role that allows them to create/update Role or ClusterRole objects, as desired.
2. Grant them permission to include specific permissions in the roles the create/update:
   • implicitly, by giving them those permissions (if they attempt to create or modify a Role or ClusterRole with permissions they themselves have not been granted, the API request will be forbidden)
   • or explicitly allow specifying any permission in a Role or ClusterRole by giving them permission to perform the escalate verb on roles or clusterroles resources in the rbac.authorization.k8s.io API group (Kubernetes 1.12 and newer)

A user can only create/update a role binding if they already have all the permissions contained in the referenced role (at the same scope as the role binding) or if they’ve been given explicit permission to perform the bind verb on the referenced role. For example, if “user-1” does not have the ability to list secrets cluster-wide, they cannot create a ClusterRoleBinding to a role that grants that permission. To allow a user to create/update role bindings:

1. Grant them a role that allows them to create/update RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding objects, as desired.
2. Grant them permissions needed to bind a particular role:
   • implicitly, by giving them the permissions contained in the role.
   • explicitly, by giving them permission to perform the bind verb on the particular role (or cluster role).

For example, this cluster role and role binding would allow “user-1” to grant other users the admin, edit, and view roles in the “user-1-namespace” namespace:

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: role-grantor
rules:
- apiGroups: ["rbac.authorization.k8s.io"]
  resources: ["rolebindings"]
  verbs: ["create"]
- apiGroups: ["rbac.authorization.k8s.io"]
  resources: ["clusterroles"]
  verbs: ["bind"]
  resourceNames: ["admin","edit","view"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
  name: role-grantor-binding
  namespace: user-1-namespace
roleRef:
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: role-grantor
subjects:
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
  kind: User
  name: user-1

When bootstrapping the first roles and role bindings, it is necessary for the initial user to grant permissions they do not yet have. To bootstrap initial roles and role bindings:

• Use a credential with the system:masters group, which is bound to the cluster-admin super-user role by the default bindings.
• If your API server runs with the insecure port enabled (--insecure-port), you can also make API calls via that port, which does not enforce authentication or authorization.

Command-line Utilities

kubectl create role

Creates a Role object defining permissions within a single namespace. Examples:

• Create a Role named “pod-reader” that allows user to perform “get”, “watch” and “list” on pods:

  kubectl create role pod-reader --verb=get --verb=list --verb=watch --resource=pods
  

• Create a Role named “pod-reader” with resourceNames specified:

  kubectl create role pod-reader --verb=get --resource=pods --resource-name=readablepod --resource-name=anotherpod
  

• Create a Role named “foo” with apiGroups specified:

  kubectl create role foo --verb=get,list,watch --resource=replicasets.apps
  

• Create a Role named “foo” with subresource permissions:

  kubectl create role foo --verb=get,list,watch --resource=pods,pods/status
  

• Create a Role named “my-component-lease-holder” with permissions to get/update a resource with a specific name:

  kubectl create role my-component-lease-holder --verb=get,list,watch,update --resource=lease --resource-name=my-component
  

kubectl create clusterrole

Creates a ClusterRole object. Examples:

• Create a ClusterRole named “pod-reader” that allows user to perform “get”, “watch” and “list” on pods:

  kubectl create clusterrole pod-reader --verb=get,list,watch --resource=pods
  

• Create a ClusterRole named “pod-reader” with resourceNames specified:

  kubectl create clusterrole pod-reader --verb=get --resource=pods --resource-name=readablepod --resource-name=anotherpod
  

• Create a ClusterRole named “foo” with apiGroups specified:

  kubectl create clusterrole foo --verb=get,list,watch --resource=replicasets.apps
  

• Create a ClusterRole named “foo” with subresource permissions:

  kubectl create clusterrole foo --verb=get,list,watch --resource=pods,pods/status
  

• Create a ClusterRole name “foo” with nonResourceURL specified:

  kubectl create clusterrole "foo" --verb=get --non-resource-url=/logs/*
  

• Create a ClusterRole name “monitoring” with aggregationRule specified:

  kubectl create clusterrole monitoring --aggregation-rule="rbac.example.com/aggregate-to-monitoring=true"
  

kubectl create rolebinding

Grants a Role or ClusterRole within a specific namespace. Examples:

• Within the namespace “acme”, grant the permissions in the admin ClusterRole to a user named “bob”:

  kubectl create rolebinding bob-admin-binding --clusterrole=admin --user=bob --namespace=acme
  

• Within the namespace “acme”, grant the permissions in the view ClusterRole to the service account in the namespace “acme” named “myapp” :

  kubectl create rolebinding myapp-view-binding --clusterrole=view --serviceaccount=acme:myapp --namespace=acme
  

• Within the namespace “acme”, grant the permissions in the view ClusterRole to a service account in the namespace “myappnamespace” named “myapp”:

  kubectl create rolebinding myappnamespace-myapp-view-binding --clusterrole=view --serviceaccount=myappnamespace:myapp --namespace=acme
  

kubectl create clusterrolebinding

Grants a ClusterRole across the entire cluster, including all namespaces. Examples:

• Across the entire cluster, grant the permissions in the cluster-admin ClusterRole to a user named “root”:

  kubectl create clusterrolebinding root-cluster-admin-binding --clusterrole=cluster-admin --user=root
  

• Across the entire cluster, grant the permissions in the system:node-proxier ClusterRole to a user named “system:kube-proxy”:

  kubectl create clusterrolebinding kube-proxy-binding --clusterrole=system:node-proxier --user=system:kube-proxy
  

• Across the entire cluster, grant the permissions in the view ClusterRole to a service account named “myapp” in the namespace “acme”:

  kubectl create clusterrolebinding myapp-view-binding --clusterrole=view --serviceaccount=acme:myapp
  

kubectl auth reconcile

Creates or updates rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 API objects from a manifest file.

Missing objects are created, and the containing namespace is created for namespaced objects, if required.

Existing roles are updated to include the permissions in the input objects, and remove extra permissions if --remove-extra-permissions is specified.

Existing bindings are updated to include the subjects in the input objects, and remove extra subjects if --remove-extra-subjects is specified.

Examples:

• Test applying a manifest file of RBAC objects, displaying changes that would be made:

  kubectl auth reconcile -f my-rbac-rules.yaml --dry-run
  

• Apply a manifest file of RBAC objects, preserving any extra permissions (in roles) and any extra subjects (in bindings):

  kubectl auth reconcile -f my-rbac-rules.yaml
  

• Apply a manifest file of RBAC objects, removing any extra permissions (in roles) and any extra subjects (in bindings):

  kubectl auth reconcile -f my-rbac-rules.yaml --remove-extra-subjects --remove-extra-permissions
  

See the CLI help for detailed usage.

Service Account Permissions

Default RBAC policies grant scoped permissions to control-plane components, nodes, and controllers, but grant no permissions to service accounts outside the kube-system namespace (beyond discovery permissions given to all authenticated users).

This allows you to grant particular roles to particular service accounts as needed. Fine-grained role bindings provide greater security, but require more effort to administrate. Broader grants can give unnecessary (and potentially escalating) API access to service accounts, but are easier to administrate.

In order from most secure to least secure, the approaches are:

1. Grant a role to an application-specific service account (best practice)

   This requires the application to specify a serviceAccountName in its pod spec, and for the service account to be created (via the API, application manifest, kubectl create serviceaccount, etc.).

   For example, grant read-only permission within “my-namespace” to the “my-sa” service account:

   kubectl create rolebinding my-sa-view \
     --clusterrole=view \
     --serviceaccount=my-namespace:my-sa \
     --namespace=my-namespace

2. Grant a role to the “default” service account in a namespace

   If an application does not specify a serviceAccountName, it uses the “default” service account.

   Note: Permissions given to the “default” service account are available to any pod in the namespace that does not specify a serviceAccountName.

   For example, grant read-only permission within “my-namespace” to the “default” service account:

   kubectl create rolebinding default-view \
     --clusterrole=view \
     --serviceaccount=my-namespace:default \
     --namespace=my-namespace

   Many add-ons currently run as the “default” service account in the kube-system namespace. To allow those add-ons to run with super-user access, grant cluster-admin permissions to the “default” service account in the kube-system namespace.

   Note: Enabling this means the kube-system namespace contains secrets that grant super-user access to the API.

   kubectl create clusterrolebinding add-on-cluster-admin \
     --clusterrole=cluster-admin \
     --serviceaccount=kube-system:default

3. Grant a role to all service accounts in a namespace

   If you want all applications in a namespace to have a role, no matter what service account they use, you can grant a role to the service account group for that namespace.

   For example, grant read-only permission within “my-namespace” to all service accounts in that namespace:

   kubectl create rolebinding serviceaccounts-view \
     --clusterrole=view \
     --group=system:serviceaccounts:my-namespace \
     --namespace=my-namespace

4. Grant a limited role to all service accounts cluster-wide (discouraged)

   If you don’t want to manage permissions per-namespace, you can grant a cluster-wide role to all service accounts.

   For example, grant read-only permission across all namespaces to all service accounts in the cluster:

   kubectl create clusterrolebinding serviceaccounts-view \
     --clusterrole=view \
    --group=system:serviceaccounts

5. Grant super-user access to all service accounts cluster-wide (strongly discouraged)

   If you don’t care about partitioning permissions at all, you can grant super-user access to all service accounts.

   Warning: This allows any user with read access to secrets or the ability to create a pod to access super-user credentials.

   kubectl create clusterrolebinding serviceaccounts-cluster-admin \
     --clusterrole=cluster-admin \
     --group=system:serviceaccounts

Upgrading from 1.5

Prior to Kubernetes 1.6, many deployments used very permissive ABAC policies, including granting full API access to all service accounts.

Default RBAC policies grant scoped permissions to control-plane components, nodes, and controllers, but grant no permissions to service accounts outside the kube-system namespace (beyond discovery permissions given to all authenticated users).

While far more secure, this can be disruptive to existing workloads expecting to automatically receive API permissions. Here are two approaches for managing this transition:

Parallel Authorizers

Run both the RBAC and ABAC authorizers, and specify a policy file that contains the legacy ABAC policy:

--authorization-mode=RBAC,ABAC --authorization-policy-file=mypolicy.json

The RBAC authorizer will attempt to authorize requests first. If it denies an API request, the ABAC authorizer is then run. This means that any request allowed by either the RBAC or ABAC policies is allowed.

When the apiserver is run with a log level of 5 or higher for the RBAC component (--vmodule=rbac*=5 or --v=5), you can see RBAC denials in the apiserver log (prefixed with RBAC DENY:). You can use that information to determine which roles need to be granted to which users, groups, or service accounts. Once you have granted roles to service accounts and workloads are running with no RBAC denial messages in the server logs, you can remove the ABAC authorizer.

Permissive RBAC Permissions

You can replicate a permissive policy using RBAC role bindings.

Warning:

The following policy allows ALL service accounts to act as cluster administrators. Any application running in a container receives service account credentials automatically, and could perform any action against the API, including viewing secrets and modifying permissions. This is not a recommended policy.

kubectl create clusterrolebinding permissive-binding \
  --clusterrole=cluster-admin \
  --user=admin \
  --user=kubelet \
  --group=system:serviceaccounts

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